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Abstract
In my paper I consider the question, whether one can reconcile radical apo-
phatic perspective with the realistic interpretation of religious discourse. Both 
are supported by very important religious intuitions, but seem to be mutual-
ly inconsistent. In order to show what form of “apophatic realism” is possible 
to hold, I analyze the thought of Nicolas of Cusa: fifteenth century mystic and 
philosopher, whose thought does justice to the deepest religious intuitions and 
can be inspiring, and – in its basic principles – also tenable, even in XXI century.
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I
In my paper1 I argued for a versions of theism which I called “apophatic 
theism.” The apophatic theism I advocated is not a purely speculative 
position. To the contrary, it has its roots in a religious attitude of wor-
ship and – also religious – intuition that it is of ultimate importance 
that a human person should not worship something which is not wor-
thy of worship, i.e. something which is not of absolute character – that 
is to say, the intuition that a religious person should make all the effort 
to avoid idolatry.
I  argued that no  object which can be  grasped in  any conceptual 
system is worthy of worship, i.e. that the object of non-idolatrous wor-
ship (called “God”) is beyond every assertion and denial. But – and this 
was the conclusion of my paper – the “apophatic” problem is deeper: 
a religious person has a problem not only with ascribing to God any 
particular characteristics, but also with the very reference of the term 
“God.” If God is beyond every assertion and denial, then the word “God” 
neither has nor has not the object of reference.
The conclusion of my paper poses, however, another very important 
question: can we  understand religious discourse in  any realistic sense. 
This question is important not only for a philosopher, but also for a re-
ligious person. As many scholars of religion point out, there is a strict 
connection between the notions of  the “sacred” and that of  the “real.” 
Religious persons worship what is sacred, and that what is sacred is (for 
them) far more real than any mundane, profane reality. So the question 
which I’m going to consider in the present paper is: can we retain this re-
ligious intuition within a strong apophatic perspective (I advocated for)?
Given the rich diversity of philosophical understanding of what it is 
to be real (i.e. the diversity of philosophical realism), it  is almost im-
possible to give one general answer to this question. This is why in the 
following part of my paper I will focus on the thought of fifteenth cen-
tury mystic Nicolas of Cusa. He managed to integrate a deep mystical 
insight with some very sophisticated philosophical insights and argu-
ments, which makes him a very valuable source of inspiration also for 
contemporary philosophical and theological debate (and such a debate 
on the topic of religious realism, in particular).
1 P. Sikora, Atheism, Agnosticism, and Apophatic Theism, Polish Journal of Philoso-
phy 4 (2010) No. 1 (Spring 2010), pp. 65–80.
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II
The assumption which lies at the roots of  Nicholas’ considerations 
is that whatever God may be, S/He must be of absolute character. What 
is important to note is that this is not a speculative but a religious re-
mark – for Cusanus nothing non-absolute is worthy of religious striv-
ing of the human being. Nicholas thinks through all the consequences 
of this assumption. The result is the following:
I give the name “Maximum” to that than which there cannot be any-
thing greater. But fullness befits what is  one. Thus, oneness—which 
is also being—coincides with Maximality. But if such oneness is alto-
gether free from all relation and contraction, obviously nothing is op-
posed to it, since it is Absolute Maximality. Thus, the Maximum is the 
Absolute One which is all things. And all things are in the Maximum 
(for it is the Maximum); and since nothing is opposed to it, the Mini-
mum likewise coincides with it, and hence the Maximum is also in all 
things. And because it is absolute, it is, actually, every possible being; 
it  contracts nothing from things, all of which [derive] from it.2 (De 
Docta Ignorantia3 1, 2, 5)
In the passage cited above Nicholas starts with the idea that the 
goal of religious life is that there cannot be anything greater than. This 
idea leads him to the most “realistic” conclusions, i.e. that “Maximum” 
is not only all things which exist, and that it is in all things, but that 
it is every possible being. One cannot conceive anything more real than 
“Maximum”: “Hence, since the absolutely Maximum is all that which 
can be, it is altogether actual” (DI 1, 4, 11).
Here lies, however, a  deep apophatic problem, very much similar 
to  that pointed out in my paper4 – namely the problem of reference 
of the words “Maximum,” “God.” As Nicholas puts it:
Since the Maximum is  the unqualifiedly Maximum, to  which noth-
ing is opposed, it is evident that no name can properly befit it. For all 
2 All quotes of Nicholas’ works in J. Hopkins’ translation, available on: http://
jasper-hopkins.info.
3 Herafter: DI.
4 P. Sikora, Atheism, Agnosticism, and Apophatic Theism, pp. 65–80.
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names are bestowed on  the basis of  a  oneness of  conception [ratio] 
through which one thing is distinguished from another. But where all 
things are one, there can be  no proper name. Hence, Hermes Tris-
megistus rightly says: “Since God is  the totality of  things, no name 
is proper to Him; for either He would have to be called by every name 
or else all things would have to be called by His name.” (DI 1, 24, 75)
The apophatic conclusion, i.e. the fundamental problem with the 
reference of the term “God,” stems from the Nicholas’ view of language 
and cognition. According to Cusanus, language is a  system of differ-
ences (or even oppositions). This means that each linguistic term has 
a meaning in the contexts of other linguistic terms which have differ-
ent meanings than the former, the meanings we capture in the process 
of differentiation and comparison.
Such a view of  language is strictly connected with Nicholas’ view 
of cognition. In this view “every inquiry proceeds by means of a com-
parative relation” (DI 1, 1, 3) – it is a process in which a subject compares 
what is not known (yet) to what is (already) known. But, what is very 
important, the process does not start with the insight into essences 
of the things compared and then – on the basis of this putative insight – 
proceeds to the act of the comparison of the two previously identified 
entities. Rather, it starts with the acknowledgment of the apparent dif-
ferences, and results in constructing the identities of different beings 
in the process of naming acknowledged differences:
The fact that you know a man not to be a stone derives not from any 
knowledge by which you have knowledge of man and stone and their 
difference. Rather, it  occurs per accidens, on  the basis of  a  difference 
both of  the functions and of  the visible forms, to  which, when you 
discern them, you give different names. For a  movement in  our dis-
criminating reason imposes names. (De Deo Abscondito,5 4)
Further details of  this process are described by Nicholas in more 
details in his work Idiota de mente (On Wisdom and Knowledge):6
5 Hereafter: DA.
6 Hereafter: DM.
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[R]eason’s operation concerns things that are captured by the senses 
(reason distinguishes, harmonizes, and differentiates these things), 
so that in our reason there is nothing that was not previously in our 
senses. In this way, then, reason imposes names and is moved to give 
this name to one thing and another name to another thing. But since 
in  those things with which reason is  occupied form is  not present 
in its true nature, reason resorts to surmise and opinion. Hence, insofar 
as both kinds and species are captured by a name they are entities-of-
reason that reason has made for itself from its harmonizing and dif-
ferentiating of perceptible objects. (DM 64–65)7
In the passages quoted above Cusanus makes an important claim 
about language, namely that our linguistic ability is closely connected 
with our power of discrimination. This power, however, does not reach 
the very essences of beings, but is  limited to the sphere of “operatio-
num et figurarum” (functions/ actions and visible forms”), and because 
of that “reason resorts to surmise and opinion” – i.e. can only reach some 
level of contingent, provisional opinion. The process of discrimination 
is not of the purely sensual character, but includes some rational aspect 
(“a movement of discriminating reason”) which “imposes names,” i.e. 
has a discursive aspect. On the other hand, discursive activity depends 
on sensual perception. For that reason, there is a strict mutual connec-
tion between our perceptual recognition-abilities and the rational, con-
ceptual activity. One can say that our perception is conceptually-laden, 
and our concepts are perception-dependent.
Moreover, according to Cusanus, what we recognize is not an ab-
solute objective essence of  things (the world as  it is  from God’s-eye- 
-point-of-view) but what we perceive with our perceptible apparatus 
and conceptually grasp with our rational resources. “Kinds and species” 
into which we categorize our experience of the world “are entities-of- 
-reason,” i.e. it is only within our conceptual schemes in place one can 
see the world as consisting of particular objects which have particular 
characteristics and belongs to particular categories.
The view sketched by Nicholas very smoothly fits with the ideas de-
veloped and well defended in XXth century by Hilary Putnam8. One can 
7 Translation slightly changed.
8 My argumentation why and to what extend the Putnam’s ideas are plausible, 
see: P. Sikora, Słowa i zbawienie. Dyskurs religijny w perspektywie Hilarego Putnama, 
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easily see here close similarities to the basis assumptions of Putnam’s 
internal or pragmatic realism, namely that the world we inhabit and 
get to know is not the Reality-as-it-is-in-itself, the Reality-as-it-is-in- 
-God’s-Eye-point-of-view, but a reality as it is perceived, conceived and 
interacted with by us: human agents with sensual-and-conceptual recog- 
nition abilities. Secondly, that our perceptual and conceptual abilities 
are mutually interwoven.
Also, Cusanus’ view on  language  – even if  he does not provide 
us with a lot of details – shares basic insights with some Putnam’s so-
phisticated and plausible conceptions of language.9
Despite possible differences in details the fifteenth century mystic 
and twentieth century analytical philosopher agree on what is crucial 
in present context, namely: (1) On the fact that no linguistic term has 
a meaning on its own, independently from the broader linguistic con-
text in which it occurs; for every word to have meaning it must be a part 
of the system of multiple words. (2) That the reference of a given term 
is  established in  the process which includes an  act of  identification 
of  the object of  reference of  that term. Such an act of  identification, 
however, consists in a differentiation of the object of reference from the 
broader context or background against which it is identified.
In my articles10 I sketched out how the question of realism of reli-
gious language may be answered from the perspective which accepts 
basic insights of Putnam’s thought. The main conclusion was that – be-
cause in the Putnamian perspective all reality and existence which can 
be conceived by a human person is conditioned and dependent on the 
humanly constructed conceptual scheme – the religious realism con-
sists in a real character of human transformation achieved throughout 
religious engagement rather than in any metaphysically-realistic inter-
pretation of the object of reference of the central religious category – i.e. 
category of God.
Given the fundamental congruence between Cusanus’ and Put-
nam’s view on  language and discursive cognition it may be  inspiring 
Kraków 2004. See also there for the references to the relevant Hilary Putnam’s works.
  9 Nicholaus’ idea that language is a system of differences finds support not only 
in  the Putnam’s ideas but in  all the views which accept and develop the work and 
thought of De Saussure’s semiotics.
10 P. Sikora, Realizm i teologia, in: R. Woźniak (ed.), Metafizyka i teologia, Kraków 
2008, pp. 323–342 2011; P. Sikora, Wielość religii a debata: realizm/antyrealizm religijny, 
Diametros 29 (2011), pp. 93–109.
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to look at how the former – as both philosopher and mystic – sees the 
role of language in the religious life and how he understands religious 
realism.
III
It should not surprise us that having acknowledged all these facts about 
language and cognition Nicholaus sees clearly a fundamental problem 
with respect to the human efforts to speak about what religious people 
regard as the goal of their religious engagement, and call “God” (and 
which Nicholaus calls “Maximum” in order to stress its absolute char-
acter). The problem one here faces is, as I stressed above, not confined 
to the problem of ascribing to God any characteristic, i.e. to the prob-
lem of predication anything about God. The main problem lies deeper 
and consists in the impossibility of establishing proper reference of the 
terms such as “God” and “Maximum.”
The problem stems from the two assumptions: (1) The necessary 
condition for a term to gain a reference is that the object of reference 
is identified by being distinguished from the broader background, and 
(2) nothing which can be an element of the broader reality could count 
as a goal of the religious engagement (cannot be named “God”). The 
conclusion is that no possible object of reference (of any linguistic term, 
including “God”) could be named “God.”
This conclusion is  very problematical as  regards the realistic char-
acter of religious language, at  least in cases of theistic religions, such 
as Christianity – which was the religion of Nicholas of Cusa. In those 
cases the term “God” (and its synonyms like “Allah,” “Jahweh” etc.) 
is the central term of a given conceptual system, a term which all the 
rest of a discourse is built around. All other words have their religious 
meanings only “sub specie Dei”11  – in  relation to  God. This is  why 
it seems to be crucial for realistic interpretation of religious language 
whether the term “God” is  to be  interpreted realistically. And from 
the philosophcal-theoretical point of  view this question in  turn can 
be stated in the following form: Is it the case that the term “God” has 
some real object of reference? The answer which emerges from Cusanus’ 
11 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 1, a. 7, http://www.corpusthomis-
ticum.org/sth1001.html (20.11.2016).
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considerations – which are in its basic insights supported by contem-
porary philosophical view of  language  – seems to  be negative: that 
there is no object of reference of the term “God.”
On the other hand one should not forget that the source of  the 
problem was Nicholas’ acknowledgment of  a  fundamental religious 
intuition that the ultimate goal (and horizon) of religious life (which 
includes thought) is maximally great, perfect and real. This intuition 
block a possible rejoinder to Nicholas’ conclusion.
The rejoinder I  have in  mind goes as  follows: It  starts from the 
remark that there may be many levels or kinds of  reality: the reality 
of physical objects, the reality of mathematical objects, etc. There is also, 
it is claimed, the reality of the story-world of a narrative. Objects and 
characters which are part of  such a  story are real in  different sense 
than objects of our external environment but, nevertheless, they are real. 
One should then acknowledged that the word “God” is  indisputably 
a part of many religious stories (e.g. biblical ones). In most of  these 
cases, one can argue, there is a possibility to identify the referent of that 
word within the story-world. The word “God” may have some fictional 
character as its object of reference.
The rejoinder fails, because for a religious person such a fictional re-
ality of a story-world is – in the case of the word “God” – much to weak. 
There are of course, a religious person would admit, some stories which 
refer to fictional characters (e.g. Job and his friends in the Book of Job). 
They play an  important role in  the religious life of  a person, even if   
s/he has a clear awareness of the fictional status of the characters of the 
story. But in the case of the word “God” the situation is totally different: 
if a person thinks “God” refers only to the fictional character within 
a story, s/he can not remain a religious person.
Nicholas is well aware of the problem stated above, and, he remains 
a religious person, for whom the goal of his engagement is sacred and 
because of that cannot be less real than the most real beings he encoun-
ters in his life; even more: in comparison to  the goal of his religious 
engagement the most real beings in the world seem to be completely 
unreal (the ultimate goal is  a  necessary basis for a  contingent world 
of mundane beings). Cusanus decides then to embrace paradoxical an-
swer to the question in what sense the religious language can be realistic:
Moreover, the greatest truth is the absolutely Maximum. Therefore, (1) 
it  is most greatly true either that the unqualifiedly Maximum exists 
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or that it does not exist, or (2) [it is most greatly true that it] both exists 
and does not exist, or (3) [it is most greatly true that it] neither exists 
nor does not exist. Now, no more [alternatives] can be either asserted 
or thought. No matter which one of them you say to be most greatly 
true, my point is made. For I have the greatest truth, which is the un-
qualifiedly Maximum. (DI 1, 6, 16)
This paradoxical character of  the existence of  Maximum is  for 
Nicholas not something which cannot be experienced, i.e. it should not 
be  conceived as  existing outside the world in which a human being 
lives. This is expressed by (also paradoxical) statements which for many 
persons may smack pantheistically:
Therefore, because the absolutely Maximum is  absolutely and actu-
ally all things which can be (and is so free of all opposition that the 
Minimum coincides with it), it is beyond both all affirmation and all 
negation. And it is not, as well as is, all that which is conceived to be; 
and it is, as well as is not, all that which is conceived not to be. But it is 
a given thing in such way that it is all things; and it is all things in such 
way that it is no thing; and it is maximally a given thing in such way 
that it is it minimally. (DI 1, 4, 12)
Paradoxical nature of religious language means that it is impossible 
to formulate any consistent metaphysical theory which would explain 
the ontological status of  God, neither realistic nor non-realistic one. 
If so, it is reasonable to ask what is the point of producing such para-
doxical religious discourse, which seems to state something about God, 
(particularly which states that God exists and that God existence has 
absolute character), but which et  the end of  the day turns out to be 
a stream of contradictories, and which should be withdrawn in the act 
of apophasis.
IV
According to Cusanus the point of religious discourse is a pragmatic 
one. It  is necessary for inspiring and directing the religious attitude 
of worship (“cultura Dei”), but must be negated in  the very process 
of religious engagement in order to avoid idolatry:
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The worshipping of God, who is to be worshiped in spirit and in truth, 
must be based upon affirmations about Him. Accordingly, every religion, 
in its worshipping, must mount upward by means of affirmative theolo-
gy (…) And so, the theology of negation is so necessary for the theology 
of affirmation that without it God would not be worshiped as the Infi-
nite God but, rather, as a creature. And such worship is idolatry; it as-
cribes to the image that which befits only the reality itself. (DI 1, 26, 86)
How such an necessary act of  an apophatic use of  language may 
look like Cusanus tries to  show in  a  short piece entitled Dialogus 
de Deo abscondito – On the Hidden God. It is the fictional dialogue be-
tween two characters: a Christian and a Pagan. Dialogue begins with 
the Pagan’s acknowledgment of the Christian’s deep piety, the attitude 
of worship. The Pagan asks the Christian about the object the latter 
worships, wanting him to give some idea of what he  is worshipping. 
The Christian states that he doesn’t know who God (the name of the 
“object” of worship) is, and explains that this lack of knowledge is pre-
cisely the reason of his religious attitude. Such an answer seems for the 
Pagan to be nonsensical, so he continues to ask, attempting to drive 
out the Christian’s actual even if  unspoken conception of  God. The 
Christian consequently refuses to admit to any of formulations, arising 
during conversation, as to his conception of God.
Let us now focus on some particularly interesting and enlightening 
parts of the dialogue:
Pagan: I ask you, Brother, to lead me to the point of being able to un-
derstand you regarding your God. Tell me: what do you know about 
the God you worship?
Christian: I  know that whatever-I-know is  not God and that what- 
ever-I-conceive is not like God but that God excels [all this].
Pagan: Therefore, God is nothing.
Christian: It is not the case that He is nothing, for this nothing has the 
name “nothing.”
Pagan: If He is not nothing, then He is something.
Christian: He is not something, either. For something is not every-thing. 
And it is not the case that God is something rather than every-thing.
Pagan: You make strange claims: that the God whom you worship 
is  neither nothing nor something. No  reasoning grasps this point. 
(DA 8–9)
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The passage begins with (repeated by the Pagan again and again) the 
request for the Christian to express what the latter knows about God 
he worships. Christian again explains that no possible object of knowl-
edge can count as  the God worthy to worship. The Pagan’s reaction 
consists in an attempt to interpret Christian discourse non-realistically: 
if nothing counts for the Christian as God, than God is nothing, i.e. 
the term “God” is  without referent. The Christian, however, refuses 
to accept such an interpretation, in so far as it is understood as some 
description of a particular metaphysical state of affaires, a description 
which uses well defined categories, esp. category of nothing (“for this 
nothing has the name ‘nothing’”). The Pagan’s reaction reveals that 
his way of thinking is trapped in the binary opposition: if God is not 
nothing, He must be something, which refutes the initial claim of the 
Christian. Because the Christian doesn’t withdraw from that, the Pa-
gan concludes that Christian position is unreasonable.
Because of this conclusion, drawn by the Pagan at this point of the 
dialogue, conversation broadens its topic, i.e. includes the motif of di-
vine ineffability and more explicitly links semantic and ontological 
questions:
Pagan: Can He be named?
Christian: What can be named is small. That whose greatness cannot 
be conceived remains ineffable.
Pagan: But is He ineffable?
Christian: He  is not ineffable, though He  is beyond all things effa-
ble; for He is the Cause of all nameable things. How is it, then, that 
He Himself, who gives to others a name, is without a name?
Pagan: So He is both effable and ineffable.
Christian: Not that either. For God is not the foundation of contradic-
tion but is Simplicity, which is prior to every foundation. Hence, we are 
also not to say that He is both effable and ineffable.
Pagan: What, then, will you say of Him?
Christian: That it is neither the case that He is named or is not named 
nor the case that He both is named and is not named. Rather, whatever 
can be said disjunctively or conjunctively, whether consistently or con-
tradictorily, does not befit Him (because of the excellence of His infin-
ity), so that He is the one Beginning, which is prior to every thought 
formable of it.
Pagan: So, then, being would not befit God.
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Christian: Your statement is correct.
Pagan: Therefore, He is nothing.
Christian: It is not the case that He is nothing or that He is not noth-
ing; nor is He both nothing and not nothing. Rather, He is the Source 
and Origin of all the beginnings of being and of not-being.
Pagan: God is the Source of the beginnings of being and of not-being?
Christian: No.
Pagan: But you just said this.
Christian: When I  said it, I  spoke the truth; and I  am speaking the 
truth now, when I deny it. (DA 10–11)
The above passage shows that in the course of the conversation the 
Pagan has managed to broaden his way of thinking, giving up the at-
tachment to the law of excluded middle: he is now ready to admit that 
God in Christian conception is both effable and ineffable. When seen 
from the contemporary point of view – in which we are much more ac-
customed to non-classical logical systems – this may seem to be a huge 
cognitive development. But for the Christian partner in the dialogue 
(i.e. for Nicholas) the current Pagan’s position is still a wrong one. This 
is  because it  is still a  theoretical position which tries to  capture the 
nature of God – this time just using a richer set of logical tools. The 
Christian’s critique of this broadened Pagan’s position leads the latter 
once again to  the non-realistic interpretation of Christian God-talk, 
the interpretation once again refuted by  the Christian. Here comes 
a very interesting fragment: The Christian refutes non-realistic inter-
pretation of his God-talk by formulating statement that God “is the 
source Source and Origin of all the beginnings of being and of not-be-
ing.” The Pagan is very happy, having finally caught – i his opinion – the 
Christian on the definite formula about God’s nature. But Christian 
immediately negates what he have just said, and claims that in both 
cases he  has been speaking the truth, leaving the Pagan in  a  confu-
sion. Confusion deepens in the final parts of the dialogue which tackles 
explicitly the question of reference of the name “God.” The Christian 
states that “we do not call true the statement that ‘God’ is His name; 
nor do we call that statement false, for it is not false that ‘God’ is His 
name. Nor do we say that the statement is both true and false” (DA 13).
The whole point of  such a  strange talk shows up  in the final sen-
tence of the dialogue, spoken by the Pagan: “Therefore, may God, who 
is hidden from the eyes of all the wise of the world, be blessed forever.” 
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In this sentence the Pagan acknowledges that God is “hidden,” i.e. that 
it  is senseless to  try to  get any knowledge about Him and His na-
ture. Secondly, and more importantly, this sentence is  not a  descrip-
tive one. In this utterance the Pagan does not describe anything but 
confesses his un-knowledge and expresses praise. The Christian has 
accomplished his goal: he has persuaded Pagan to change attitude from 
a theoretical to the “practical” one – the Pagan stops asking theoretical 
questions and joins the Christian in the act of worship (without having 
any knowledge about the object of worship).
V
The dialogue On the Hidden God shows us that negative or apophatic 
theology should not be  understood as  some theory about God ex-
pressed in negative statements. It is rather “a language of unsaying”12 – 
a process which involves human subjects living in  time. Within this 
process, language utterances – also those that have the form of state-
ments (or negations) – are used to foster the process of “mounting up,” 
elevation, or ascent. Their role is not to say something about God but 
rather to block any way of theoretical thinking about the ultimate goal 
and horizon of  religious engagement, to break down any theoretical 
picture of God (and His/Her relation to the world), to deconstruct any 
metaphysical theory of the ultimate reality.
As the dialogue On the Hidden God shows, the process of such a de-
construction is carried by the use of language, and that deconstructing 
utterances may be misunderstood – i.e. interpreted as statements stat-
ing something about God either in positive form (making Him some-
thing) or in negative one (making Him nothing). For that reason they 
need further linguistic acts which correct such a misunderstanding. The 
question remains as to whether this is infinite process, as some scholars 
insists13 of whether it ends at some point.
Nicholas answer to that question is quite clear:
However, someone who desires to  grasp the meaning must elevate 
his intellect above the import of the words rather than insisting upon 
12 M. Sells, The Mystical Language of Unsaying, Chicago–London 1994.
13 This is the Sells’ thesis, cf.: M. Sells, The Mystical Language of Unsaying, p. 2ff. 
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the proper significations of words which cannot be properly adapted 
to  such great intellectual mysteries. Moreover, it  is necessary to  use 
guiding illustrations in a transcendent way and to leave behind percep-
tible things, so  that the reader may readily ascend unto simple intel-
lectuality. (DI 1, 2, 8)
Human religious ascent leads above “the import of  words” unto 
“simple intellectuality.” Given the fact that language belongs to  the 
sphere of “multiplicity,” Nicholas claims that the goal of the discursive 
activity is to lead a human subject to the point where all the multiplic-
ity, including the multiplicity of linguistic signs, drops out. This is the 
lesson of On the Hidden God: the dialogue – i.e. the discursive engage-
ment ends at the point when the Pagan joins the Christian in the act 
of worship. And because of the fact that the Pagan’s description of ini-
tial attitude of the Christian (“I see that you have most devoutly pros-
trated your-self and are shedding tears of  love-not hypocritical tears 
but heart-felt ones” DA 1) expresses does not mention any word of the 
latter, so we can assume that in his last statement of the dialogue the 
Pagan expresses his worshipping attitude (more for the reader than for 
himself ) and stops talking.
Here lies the importance of the fact that the process of apophatic 
blocking of thinking and deconstruction of thoughts takes place within 
the context of  religious engagement, as  it is  expressed by  the whole 
construction of On the Hidden God: at the beginning of which lies the 
attitude of worship exhibited by the Christian; it ends when the Pagan 
joins the Christian in this attitude14. Cusanus’ dialogue shows at what 
point the discursive apophatic activity of “unsaying” stops. It must pro-
14 This fact poses a serious problem for Michael Sells’ account of apophatic dis-
course, expressed in his The Mystical Language of Unsaying. Sells wants to brackets the 
question of religious experience to focus on semantic aspects only. He claims to de-
scribe the “meaning event” that “effects a semantic union that re-creates or imitates 
the mystical union” (p. 9). In  the perspective of  Nicholas such a  bracketing of  ex-
istential, extra-linguistic dimension misses the whole point. This difference (focus 
solely on language vs. necessary openness toward non-linguistic) accounts also for the 
difference as regards the possibility of the end point of apophatic linguistic “unsaying.” 
It is precisely because Sells wants to confine his explanation to the sphere of “meaning 
event” that he does see the necessity of infinite process of linguistic “unsaying.” For 
the end of this process which sees Nicholas lies beyond language and beyond “mean-
ing event.”
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ceed as far as some of the participants of the discourse misunderstand 
its point and character of  language utterances. In  these cases Sells 
is right – further utterances correcting and undermining previous ones 
are needed. But when the addressee of  apophatic discursive strategy 
catches its point and “elevates” itself above words in  the act of  wor-
ship – discourse becomes obsolete, and religious person may rest in si-
lent “simple intellectuality.”
This fact is  of utmost importance, also because it  enables us  to 
understand in  what sense the religious discourse  – paradoxical, non-
descriptive, of pragmatic value as it is – my be an aspect of what may 
be called religious realism. As the example of Nicholas’ considerations 
has shown, religious realism cannot consist in any metaphysical inter-
pretation of religious discourse. Any such interpretation would be less 
realistic than it  should be  from the religious point of view: it would 
make God only a contingent, conditioned being not worthy of worship 
or of any other religious engagement. Proper use of religious language, 
however, leads to the engagement and attitude which includes all of the 
life of the religious person. All aspects of life are, as it were, immersed 
in the religious engagement, all aspects of reality are experienced by the 
lens of  this engagement; an engaged believer is overwhelmed by the 
sense of  – indescribable  – owe in  the face of  all embracing mystery. 
All of  this brings about that for a person there is nothing more real 
than her/his religious striving. This is the apophatic, mystical religious 
realism.
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